JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Chad

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chad

(2021/2695(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa[1],

– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on the death of President Idriss Déby Itno on 20 April 2021,

– having regard to the statement by the spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General of 20 April 2021 on Chad,

– having regard to the communiqué by the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers of 5 May 2021,

– having regard to the report of the African Union Peace and Security Council fact‑finding mission to Chad from 29 April to 5 May 2021,

– having regard to the joint declaration of the European Council and the Member States of the G5 Sahel of 28 April 2020 on the security, stability and development of the Sahel,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 reaffirming the importance of a solid and long-term partnership between the EU and the Sahel,

– having regard to the European Development Fund (EDF) 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme for Chad,

– having regard to the resolution of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU of 11 March 2021 on democracy and respect for constitutions in EU and ACP countries,

– having regard to the Constitution of Chad,

– having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

– having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 20 April 2021, the Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno, who had been in power for 31 years, died in a military confrontation with rebel groups one day after having been declared the winner of the 11 April presidential elections;

B. whereas following the death of Idriss Déby, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) organised an unconstitutional transfer of power and installed a transitional government headed by Mahamat Idriss Déby, the son of the Chadian President; whereas the TMC suspended the Constitution, dissolved the government and the National Assembly, and set up a ‘transitional charter’ to replace the Constitution for a period of 18 months, renewable once;

C. whereas the Chadian Constitution provided that in the event of a vacancy in power or permanent incapacity of the head of state, the interim presidency would be exercised by the President of the National Assembly, who must organise elections within a period of 45 to 90 days;

D. whereas on 2 May the TMC appointed a transitional government with a civilian Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Padacké, with the participation of some members of the opposition; whereas Padacké was runner-up in the 11 April presidential elections despite being considered one of the late President Déby’s allies, and served as prime minister from 2016 to 2018;

E. whereas the African Union Peace and Security Council fact-finding mission to Chad from 29 April to 5 May 2021 underlined the importance of drafting a viable and universally acceptable Constitution for Chad and considers the Transitional Charter as inadequate to guarantee the political and civil rights of the population during the transition period;

F. whereas a disproportionate and illegitimate use of armed force against demonstrators was deployed by the military government against citizens on 27 April 2021; whereas this was broadly condemned by human rights organisations and the international community, including the African Union and European Union; whereas there have been at least six deaths, dozens of people wounded and many arbitrarily arrested and detained in response to protests since President Déby’s death; whereas it is believed that more than 600 people have been arrested in the clashes;

G. whereas the tenure of President Déby was characterised by systematic and persistent human rights violations;

H. whereas the pre-election period was marked by persecution and the arbitrary arrests of more than 112 political opponents and human rights defenders; whereas in the weeks leading up to the election campaign, security forces used disproportionate and illegitimate force against peaceful protesters; whereas the elections were largely boycotted by the opposition and some members of civil society;

I. whereas the security situation in the Sahel region has significantly deteriorated in recent years, posing a serious threat to regional and international security; whereas human rights violations and mass killings are widespread; whereas the Sahel saw the most rapid increase in violent extremist activity of any region in 2019; whereas the Multinational Joint Task Force has driven terrorist groups out of many areas under their control since its establishment in 2015, though the region still remains highly unstable;

J. whereas Chad has suffered heavily from terrorist activities and attacks; whereas Boko Haram –  allied with the Islamic State since 2015 – has spread throughout the region and caused significant displacement in the Lake Chad basin; whereas there are 133 000 internally displaced persons and some 500 000 refugees currently in Chad; whereas the military confrontation with rebel groups such as the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) has intensified since this year’s elections; whereas the Chadian army recently claimed to have defeated the FACT; whereas the TMC rejected the proposal by FACT rebel armed groups to cease fire and hold negotiations;

K. whereas the EU supports the G5 Sahel, a collaborative defence effort between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger which coordinates the action in regional development and security to fight terrorism and bring stability to the region, in which the Chadian Army is a key element; whereas the mandate of the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali was extended in March 2020 to provide advice and training to national armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries, including Chad; whereas Mauritania and Niger have been designated as mediators by their G5 Sahel peers to ensure inclusive dialogue between all protagonists of the current unrest in Chad and to create the conditions for a consensual, peaceful and successful transition;

L. whereas despite being an oil-producing country, poverty, food insecurity, corruption, impunity, violence against women and girls, and a lack of economic opportunities are endemic in Chad; whereas the country is ranked 187th out of 189 countries in the 2019 Human Development Index;

M. whereas the EU supports development, peace and security efforts in Chad and throughout the Sahel through the EDF, the African Peace Facility, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and the EU Trust Fund for Africa; whereas the EU allocated EUR 542 million to Chad under the EDF between 2014 and 2020 for support including consolidation of the rule of law; whereas the future European Peace Facility is due to take over from the Africa Peace Facility on 1 July 2021;

1. Deplores the killing of President Idriss Déby and the recent violence and loss of life as a result of attacks by armed groups in the region; reiterates its concern about the protracted crisis in Chad and the volatile security situation in the north, and strongly condemns the repeated violations of human rights and international and humanitarian law;

2. Condemns the military seizure of power perpetrated by the TMC on 20 April 2021, the subsequent suspension of the Chadian Constitution, and the dissolution of the government; rejects the establishment of a charter by the TMC which has not been subject to democratic consultation;

3. Is convinced that current divisions within Chadian society cannot be addressed through military means and calls on all parties to refrain from violent action, to engage in political dialogue, and to preserve the lives of the civilian population;

4. Calls on the TMC to ensure an unhindered and swift return to constitutional order and to ensure that democratic values are upheld; notes that the appointment of a civilian transitional government including members of some opposition groups is a first step to returning to constitutional order; further calls on the TMC to create and ensure the conditions for an inclusive national dialogue between government and civil society actors and to ensure a peaceful, civilian-led and urgent transition to democratic, free and fair elections as soon as possible that would lead to a democratically elected president and inclusive government;

5. Recalls that genuine democratic transition and reform must be civilian-led and allow for the full and active involvement of civil society organisations, women and young people, opposition parties and the free press, which should be able to operate without violence, intimidation or restrictions;

6. Condemns the restriction of the right to demonstrate and the use of violence by the TMC against protestors; urges the TMC to free all those imprisoned following recent demonstrations; further calls for the establishment of an independent and impartial commission of inquiry to investigate abuses committed during the demonstrations and any human rights violations that may have occurred, including the apparent use of unnecessary or disproportionate force to disperse protests;

7. Is concerned at corruption and impunity in Chad; notes that the failure to address human rights violations contributes to the continuation of abuses and weakens public trust in state institutions;

8. Calls on the VP/HR and the EU Delegation to and EU missions in Chad to ensure the full implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, including by observing protests and by providing the requested support identified in civil society’s transition plan towards the end of the crisis;

9. Calls on the international community to support Chad in its efforts towards democracy; calls, in particular, on the African Union and the G5 to support Chad in enabling an inclusive and inter-societal dialogue with a lasting and peaceful solution; reiterates the need to refrain from intrusive external interference and to protect Chad’s unity, stability and territorial integrity; calls on the Presidents of Mauritania and Niger to continue assisting Chad as mediators in the Chadian crisis until there is a long-lasting and peaceful conclusion to the current crisis;

10. Recognises the important role Chad plays in the fight against terrorism within the G5 Sahel group; insists on the importance of respecting international human rights conventions; insists on preserving the territorial integrity and stability of Chad in the fragile security context of the region; emphasises the humanitarian need in the Sahel;

11. Recalls that regional organisations and partnerships including the African Union and G5 are key actors in organising and supporting an Africa-led strategy to addressing terrorism and instability in the Sahel; reaffirms its support for the regional Multinational Joint Task Force, and its continued support through the African Peace Facility, soon to be transferred to the European Peace Facility; calls for civil actors who report on the commission of human rights abuses to be protected, without having to face threats;

12. Recalls that climate change, food insecurity, population growth, exploitation of natural resources, poverty, and a lack of educational and economic opportunities are root causes driving instability, violence and terrorist recruitment across the Sahel; notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these pressures and significantly hampered development progress; emphasises that the coordination of security, development, humanitarian and democracy-support assistance is necessary to ensure lasting sustainable development across the region; endorses a shift towards a more integrated approach to stabilisation with a strong focus on civilian and political dimensions;

13. Stresses that Chad is and should remain a strong partner of the EU and reiterates its commitment to ensure dialogue and a peaceful solution to the current political crisis;

14. Calls for an evaluation of EU funding allocated to the region to ensure there is no misuse of funds;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and National Assembly of Chad, and the African Union and its institutions.