
BEYOND THE HASHTAG

Making BLACK LIVES MATTER in New Jersey by Closing JMSF and Building a Community-Based System of Care



A REPORT BY THE NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE









THE NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Established in 1999 by Alan V. and Amy Lowenstein, the Institute's cutting-edge racial and social justice advocacy seeks to empower people of color by building reparative systems that create wealth, transform justice and harness democratic power — from the ground up — in New Jersey. Known for our dynamic and independent advocacy aimed at toppling load-bearing walls of structural inequality to create just, vibrant and healthy communities, we are committed to exposing and repairing the cracks of structural racism in our foundation that erupt into earthquakes in communities of color. The Institute advocates for systemic reform that is at once transformative, achievable in the state and replicable in communities across the nation.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Public Welfare Foundation and the guidance provided by the Youth First Initiative. We are also grateful to former Institute Criminal Justice Reform Director Kira Shepherd, Institute intern Will Kim and Sabah Abbasi for their excellent research assistance. The Institute is also grateful to our colleagues Retha Onitiri, Brooke Lewis, Ashanti Jones, Laurie Beacham and Jake Girard for their invaluable substantive and editorial assistance.

We would also like to thank the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission for their continued partnership. In addition, the Institute would like to thank Liz Ryan, Mishi Faruqee, Carmen Daugherty, Shaena Fazal, Jeff Fleischer, Dr. Jason Williams, Dr. Sean K. Wilson, Emilie Stewart and Reverend Charles Boyer for their review of this report.

We gratefully acknowledge the Institute's Board of Trustees for their leadership, vision and stewardship: Douglas S. Eakeley, Chair; Jerome C. Harris, Jr., Vice Chair; Kenneth Y. Tanji, Treasurer; Patricia Nachtigal, Secretary; Elise C. Boddie; Paulette Brown; John J. Farmer, Jr.; Paul J. Fishman; Michael D. Francis; Rev. Timothy Adkins-Jones; Sandra King; Robin A. Lenhardt; John H. Lowenstein; Diana DeJesus-Medina; James McQueeny; B. John Pendleton, Jr.; Darrell K. Terry, Sr.; Martin Vergara, II; Nina Mitchell Wells; Antoinette-Ellis Williams; Gary M. Wingens; Zulima Farber (Emerita); Roger A. Lowenstein (Emeritus); and Theodore V. Wells, Jr. (Emeritus).

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this pandemic moment, millions are protesting across the country around one united principle: Black Lives Matter. Yet, here in New Jersey, this statement rings hollow when we look at how the state treats its Black youth. New Jersey has the highest Black to white youth incarceration disparity rate in the country, with a Black youth 21 times more likely to be locked up than a white youth. This is so even though research shows that Black and white youth commit most offenses at similar rates. As of June 1, 2020, out of 141 incarcerated youth in New Jersey, 91 are Black and



only nineteen are white. And these largely Black youth are being locked up at an exorbitant cost: this year, the state will spend \$300,000 to incarcerate each young person locked up in New Jersey's largely empty youth prisons.

Black lives cannot really matter in New Jersey when the state continues to disproportionately incarcerate its Black youth in failed youth prisons.

In response to the advocacy of the 150 Years is Enough campaign, which aims to close New Jersey's youth prisons and reinvest funds into community-based programs, New Jersey has announced the forthcoming closure of two of its youth prisons — Jamesburg and Hayes. Yet, its remaining youth prison, the Juvenile Medium Security Facility (JMSF), has been left out of the closure conversation. JMSF, the state's most secure youth prison for boys, is also a harmful penal institution: it is remote, far away from young people's families, non-rehabilitative, replete with racial disparities, financially wasteful and mostly empty. What is more, many of the young people incarcerated in JMSF have mental health needs, disabilities and have been involved with the child welfare system; these youth are in need of comprehensive treatment and services, not incarceration in a failed youth prison. While we can recognize that some young people incarcerated in JMSF may need to be in an out-of-home placement because they cannot be safely rehabilitated in the community, this placement should not be in JMSF. By contrast, community-based placements and services have been shown to effectively support and rehabilitate young people — even those who have committed serious harms.

Beyond the Hashtag: Making Black Lives Matter in New Jersey by Closing JMSF and Building a Community-Based System of Care, a report by the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, makes the case that New Jersey must close all of its youth prisons — including JMSF — and, in place of incarceration, develop a well-resourced community-based system of care that provides intensive treatment and services for young people.

- First, it describes how JMSF is an outdated representation of a punitive youth justice model.
- Second, it outlines the myriad reasons why New Jersey must close JMSF.
- Last, the report concludes by offering three policy proposals that will chart the way forward for how New Jersey can build a youth community-based continuum of care, close its three youth prisons (including JMSF), maintain public safety and keep communities and families together and whole.

To ensure that Black lives really matter in New Jersey, the state must take the following steps to radically transform its broken youth justice system:

- 1. New Jersey should create a youth community-based continuum of care and close its three youth prisons.
- 2. New Jersey should create a \$100 million lockbox fund to finance the youth community-based continuum of care.
- 3. New Jersey should pass the New Jersey Youth Justice Transformation Act.

Beyond the Hashtag: Making Black Lives Matter in New Jersey by Closing JMSF and Building a Community-Based System of Care advances why New Jersey must funnel funds into building up its young people, rather than into building youth prisons for them. Through implementation of the report's policy proposals, New Jersey can finally be a state where Black youth matter.



BEYOND THE HASHTAG:

Making Black Lives Matter in New Jersey
by Closing JMSF and Building a Community-Based System of Care



INTRODUCTION

There are no throwaway kids.

This undeniable truth, like the "Black Lives Matter" hashtag, is challenged by New Jersey's racialized youth justice system.

Beyond the hashtag, New Jersey has the highest Black/white youth incarceration disparity rate in America, with a Black youth 21 times more likely to be locked up than a white youth.¹

This disparity exists despite research that shows that Black and white youth commit most offenses at similar rates.² Any differences in the commission of certain crimes (such as violent offenses) cannot explain the extreme racial disparities in commitment.³ In our state of almost nine million people, only nineteen white youth are incarcerated as of June 1, 2020.⁴ By stark contrast, 91 of New Jersey's 141 incarcerated youth are Black.⁵

New Jersey invests \$300,000 to incarcerate each young person in its broken system 6 – a system in which over a quarter of the young people released from youth facilities return within three years. 7



Imagine the good that could be done in a child's life with an annual investment of \$300,000.

How can Black lives really matter in New Jersey when the state invests \$300,000 to incarcerate Black youth in a system characterized by these staggering racial disparities?

To be sure, New Jersey has made progress in reforming its broken youth justice system. In 2018, in response to the advocacy of the 150 Years is Enough campaign, thengovernor Chris Christie announced the closure of two of New Jersey's youth prisons, Jamesburg and Hayes — one of the most historic youth justice reforms in 150 years. The campaign urged Christie to close youth prisons and reinvest funds into the creation of a community-based system of care that builds up Black youth, not prisons for them.

Two years later, Jamesburg and Hayes remain open and the state plans to build three new youth prisons across New Jersey at a cost of over \$160 million dollars¹⁰ (over \$300 million after interest).¹¹

As thousands across New Jersey and millions across America take to the streets to call for meaningful investments in Black communities, we must embrace this transformative moment for Black lives by ending the youth prison model once and for all.

To do so, New Jersey should close all of its youth prisons, including the Juvenile Medium Security Facility (JMSF), the most secure youth prison for boys, and develop a youth community-based continuum of care.

Through such a continuum, rather than investing money into its failed youth prisons, the state can build up young people in the communities most impacted by youth incarceration. Services in such a community-based continuum should range from

prevention, intervention and diversion services at the front end to small, community-based facilities at the back end for the limited number of youth that would otherwise be in a failed youth prison and who must be kept out of home for public safety reasons. This continuum must center on keeping youth in their communities with their loved ones with intensive treatment and services.

Such a model will help New Jersey build a community-based system of care that affirms the principle that Black lives matter and empowers — rather than cages — Black youth.

This report will chart the path forward for closing all of our state's youth prisons (including JMSF) and developing a youth community-based continuum of care in three parts.

First, it will describe how JMSF is an outdated representation of a punitive youth justice model.

Second, the report will outline the myriad reasons why New Jersey must close JMSF.


Third, the report will conclude by offering three policy proposals that will chart the way forward for how New Jersey can build a youth community-based continuum of care, close its three youth prisons (including JMSF), maintain public safety and keep communities and families together and whole.

I. JMSF: AN OUTDATED REPRESENTATION OF A PUNITIVE YOUTH JUSTICE MODEL

JMSF is no place for young people.

Located in Bordentown, New Jersey, across from Hayes (New Jersey's girls' youth prison), JMSF is the state's most high-security youth prison for boys: In 2018, youth admitted to JMSF ranged in age from 14-23 years old with an average age of 18.7 years old.¹²

Rather than representing national best practices in youth rehabilitation, which push for small, community-based out-of-home placements for young people who pose public safety risks, ¹³ JMSF harkens back to an outdated era where well-intentioned concerns over keeping youth out of adult facilities transitioned to a proliferation of large, prison-like structures throughout the country. ¹⁴ As the Institute outlined in its report *Bring Our Children Home: Ain't I a Child?*, this focus on punishment over rehabilitation, which came to characterize both youth prisons and the entire youth justice system, largely targeted Black youth. ¹⁵ Many of the failures the state has cited to justify Jamesburg and Hayes' closure — such as fiscal waste, remote location and limited family interaction — also apply to JMSF. ¹⁶



JMSF incarcerates youth that have committed serious harms — including taking another's life. As outlined below, many of JMSF's young people have mental health diagnoses, are dual-system involved with the child welfare system and have disabilities.

These youth are in need of the utmost focus, treatment and services. Research has shown that this deep level of care, even for those who have committed serious harm, is best provided in a community-based placement with individualized programming and support from loved ones, not in a youth prison.¹⁷

But there is little to distinguish JMSF from an adult prison. 18 JMSF has many hallmark characteristics of a typical prison 19 – including security cameras, a secure fence, cells and a control booth. 20 JMSF is also large (with a design capacity of 262 young people), 21 not



easily accessible via public transportation²² and youth movement within the prison is closely supervised.²³

Not only is this kind of prison setting counterintuitive to the holistic goals of our youth justice system, but it also has the potential to retraumatize incarcerated youth — a group already disproportionately exposed to trauma. Prison is no place for our state's young people, particularly where, as outlined below, New Jersey's Black youth are disproportionately impacted by its harmful effects.

To be sure, advocating for the closure of JMSF may raise public safety and other questions

given its security level. While some young people currently incarcerated in JMSF may not be able to be safely released back into the community, their term of confinement should not be in JMSF: a faraway, high-security youth prison that cannot effectively rehabilitate young people and removes them from their families and communities.

As discussed more fully below, New Jersey cannot effect true youth justice transformation by ignoring — or "throwing away" — JMSF's incarcerated youth.

II. WHY NEW JERSEY MUST CLOSE JMSF AND DEVELOP A YOUTH COMMUNITY-BASED CONTINUUM OF CARE

New Jersey must make every effort to effectively support and rehabilitate all of its young people — especially those who have committed serious harm. JMSF is part of a racialized youth justice system that is, itself, harmful to Black and other communities of color.

Unlike all kids, JMSF cannot be saved. It must, like Jamesburg and Hayes, be closed. And New Jersey must create a community-based system of care that builds up Black and other youth of color.

1. JMSF Disproportionately Harms Black Youth

JMSF's prison cells are overwhelmingly filled with Black youth. New Jersey is home to the nation's largest Black to white youth incarceration disparity rate — with a Black child 21 times more likely to be locked up than a white youth. ²⁵ In 2018, of the 101 young people admitted to JMSF that year, 75 were Black and only seven were white. ²⁶ More recently, as of a June 1, 2020, one-day count, of the 44 youth incarcerated in JMSF, 31 (or 70.45%) were Black and only seven (or 15.91%) were white. ²⁷ This disparity exists even though research shows that Black and white youth commit most offenses at similar rates and that any differences in offenses committed cannot explain the racial disparities we see in incarceration. ²⁸ Significantly, New Jersey also has the fourth highest Latina/Latino to white youth incarceration disparity rate in the country; a Latina/Latino youth is four times more likely to be locked up than a white peer. ²⁹

In 2018, of the 101
young people admitted
to JMSF that year,
75 were Black and only
seven were white.

2. JMSF is a Financially Irresponsible Expenditure

Despite being cash-strapped because of the COVID-19 pandemic, New Jersey continues to fund its youth prisons at a staggering cost. This year, the state will spend \$300,000 to incarcerate each child in a state youth prison — a more than \$58,000 increase over 2018; pre-COVID-19, the state also estimated the same expenditure in 2021.³⁰ This substantial investment in youth incarceration is increasing even as the number of incarcerated youth is on the decline, going from an average daily population of 215 young people in 2018 to 186 in 2020.³¹ According to budget numbers, the Johnstone Campus, which includes both JMSF and Hayes youth prisons, is almost two-thirds empty.³²

Governor Murphy recently signed a FY 2021 state budget after working with the Legislature to determine how to prioritize limited funds in response to the huge deficits created by the international pandemic.³³ One logical step during this process would have been for the state to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of current youth prison spending and divest funding from its largely empty youth prisons





into front-end youth programs to both keep young people out of youth prisons now and moving forward — leading to future cost savings as youth are diverted out of the youth justice system.

Instead, the state only made cuts totaling less than \$7 million for operational costs deferrals and restructuring and salary reductions.³⁴ And, unfortunately, the state has cut the state/community partnership grant budget by over \$200,000.³⁵

As the Institute highlighted in its report *Bring Our Children Home: Building Up Kids Through New Jersey's Youth Services Commissions*, the state/

community partnership grant is provided to counties to assist county Youth Services Commissions (YSCs) in funding needed community-based youth programs ranging from prevention through reentry.³⁶ Significantly, YSC state funding increased by less than 50 percent between 1998 and 2018; during that same time period, state youth incarceration spending increased by 370 percent.³⁷

3. JMSF May Further Damage Vulnerable Youth

Youth prison is no place for young people. This statement is even truer for young people who come to youth prisons with pre-existing traumas and needs that require close monitoring in community-based programs with intensive treatment and services — not incarceration in faraway youth prisons.

Mental Health: Youth incarceration disproportionately impacts youth with mental health concerns. Nationally, between 65-70% of the 2 million children/adolescents arrested each year have a mental health disorder.³⁸ In 2018, almost a quarter of the young people admitted to JMSF had a mental health diagnosis.³⁹

Even starker, a June 1, 2017, assessment showed that all of the 65 youth incarcerated in JMSF at that time had a non-substance abuse mental health diagnosis.⁴⁰ Research shows that placing young people in restrictive settings to receive mental health services may lead to future delinquency and criminal behavior in adulthood.⁴¹

Moreover, studies show that some mental health treatment in secure settings can actually be harmful to young people (such as treating youth with varying mental health needs in group therapies), that skills gained in response to treatment may not remain once the young person returns to their home community⁴² and that youth incarceration can potentially worsen existing mental health concerns.⁴³ By contrast, well-funded youth community-based continuums of care allow young people with mental health needs to receive services across a number of different agencies and, most importantly, be kept within their home community.⁴⁴

Yet, New Jersey has failed to make sufficient meaningful front-end investments in young people's mental health needs. Indeed, Governor Phil Murphy recently proposed millions in budget cuts to critical school-based services, including mental health counseling and suicide prevention:⁴⁵ the funding was only restored to the budget after public outcry.⁴⁶



Artwork created by a young person from the Youth Advocate Program (YAP) in partnership with the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice and coLAB Arts

Disability Services:⁴⁷ Disabled youth are also disproportionately impacted by the youth justice system. At least one in three young people arrested each year has a disability and students with emotional disabilities are three times more likely to be arrested before high school graduation than their peers. As This is in part due to a process known as the school-to-prison pipeline through which school exclusionary discipline policies push students — who are disproportionately students of color and students with disabilities — out of classrooms and into justice system involvement.

This increased youth justice system involvement means disabled young people are also overrepresented in youth prisons: An estimated 30 to 60 percent (and as high as 85 percent) of incarcerated youth have a disability.⁵⁰ Of the 101 young people admitted to JMSF in 2018, over 40 percent required special education services.⁵¹ Instead of punishing young people for their disabilities by removing them from their schools and communities and incarcerating them in faraway youth prisons, the Garden State should instead commit to providing them with the critical services they need within their schools and/or in other community-based placements.

Child Welfare System Involvement: Dual-system youth, young people who have had involvement with both the child welfare and youth justice systems,⁵² are also overrepresented in youth prisons. Because of several factors — including limited resources and lack of agency coordination — young people most in need of intensive treatment and services are all too often funneled from the protective child welfare system into the punitive youth justice system.⁵³ This involvement with both systems has harmful results: Dual-system youth are more likely to recidivate, have more extensive mental health needs and are detained more often and for longer than their peers.⁵⁴

National estimates guess that over half of all youth involved with the youth justice system are dual-system youth.⁵⁵ Over 60 percent of 2018 JMSF admissions had a history of involvement with the child welfare system.⁵⁶ Critically, childhood maltreatment has been linked to later delinquent and criminal behavior,⁵⁷ indicating that well-funded early interventions and preventative programming can keep young people out of the youth justice system.

Rather than using incarceration to punish young people who have already been subject to trauma and mistreatment, New Jersey's focus should be on keeping these youth in their communities in appropriate placements connected to local program providers for needed treatment and services.

In New Jersey, of the 336 young people released from state juvenile facilities in 2015, over one quarter (28%) ended up back in these facilities within three years.


4. JMSF Does Not Meaningfully Increase Public Safety

While public safety is often touted as a justification for youth incarceration, New Jersey's youth prison system is ineffective at achieving this goal. Nationally, studies have shown significant recidivism rates among young people released from youth facilities.⁵⁸ In New Jersey, of the 336 young people released from state juvenile facilities in 2015, over one quarter (28%) ended up back in these facilities within three years.⁵⁹ Incarceration in and of itself is an insufficient response to increasing public safety.⁶⁰ Indeed, research has shown that incarceration increases the likelihood of reoffending.⁶¹

In contrast to faraway youth prisons, studies show that community-based placements can decrease recidivism — including for youth who commit serious harm.⁶² And, importantly, incarceration is not what crime victims want: Polling shows that crime victims prefer community-based treatment and services over incarceration.⁶³ Thus, community-based placements for young people who commit serious harm should be the default for increasing public safety, not incarceration in a state youth prison.⁶⁴

5. JMSF Is Far Away From Families and Communities

JMSF's remote location is another reason that it should be closed. Studies have shown that family and community connection are critical to youth development. Nevertheless, JMSF is located in Bordentown, New Jersey, a city in Burlington County far removed from the communities most impacted by youth incarceration. For example, the highest number of youth admitted to JMSF in 2018 resided in Camden, Essex, Middlesex and Mercer Counties; only three youth admitted to JMSF that year — out of 101 total admissions — resided in Burlington County. The youth admitted to JMSF that year — out of 101 total admissions — resided in Burlington County. Including their family, local community service providers, places of worship, mentors and other foundational community resources.



Map of New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission youth prisons (including JMSF), residential community homes and other facilities *Source:* NJ Juvenile Justice Commission

III. POLICY PROPOSALS

As history, research and data show us, JMSF is broken and cannot effectively rehabilitate young people.

So what is the solution?

Through implementation of the following three policy proposals, New Jersey can serve as a national leader in youth justice transformation by creating a youth community-based continuum of care and closing its three youth prisons (including JMSF) — while maintaining public safety.


POLICY PROPOSAL 1

New Jersey should create a youth community-based continuum of care and close its three youth prisons.

In its 150 Years is Enough Campaign Vision Document, *Investing in Kids, Not Prisons: The Urgency of Transformative Youth Justice Reform in New Jersey*, the Institute outlined what is needed to develop a youth community-based continuum of care for New Jersey's young people. Our model is two-fold. First, it outlines what resources and services are needed to develop a well-resourced continuum with effective programming, services and treatment that is intentionally designed to keep young people out of youth justice system involvement and youth prisons. And second, it outlines how we can move youth out of youth prisons into this continuum — including through the use of out-of-home placements for the small number of youth that pose a continuing public safety risk. This two-fold model is described below.

First, New Jersey should, as an initial matter, invest funding (specifically \$100 million, as outlined below) into developing a youth community-based continuum of care with effective programs, services and treatment — with a focus on the communities most impacted by youth incarceration. Such a model should place a premium on prevention, intervention and diversion services that keep young people out of the youth justice system and should also include alternatives to incarceration and reentry services. Community members and program service providers should take a leading role in developing this continuum.

Specifically, as outlined in our recent publication *Youth Justice Toolkit: A Community-Led Restorative Justice Approach*, this continuum should include restorative justice hubs that use best practices in restorative justice — a process that focuses on community-based responses to repair harm — to replace youth justice system involvement with community accountability. ⁶⁹ As further described in the toolkit, effective reentry services should also be part of this comprehensive youth continuum of care. ⁷⁰ As the state releases young people in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, ⁷¹ these youth must be met with community-based wraparound treatment and services to prevent their return to these facilities.



By making deep and lasting investments at the front end to keep young people out of youth prisons and to ensure they don't return after release, we can decrease reliance on out-of-home placements, strengthen communities and protect public safety.

Second, New Jersey must also ensure that young people who cannot be safely rehabilitated in the community (including those in JMSF) are not left out of this youth justice transformation. Studies have shown that, rather than incarceration in faraway youth prisons, community-based secure placements are effective rehabilitative settings for the small number of youth who cannot be safely released back to the community. These community-based facilities should be located within communities and integrated into the youth community-based continuum of resources and services. To integrate these placements into a continuum of care, the state



Northern Region Independence and Re-entry Success Center, Newark

should first look to the JJC's eleven existing non-secure residential community homes (RCHs) to see how they can best be used (as is or renovated/repurposed) for young people who need to be kept out of home. Spread throughout the state, most of these facilities, at least on paper, follow many of the hallmarks of national best practices in that they are small, focused on rehabilitation and, by their design, currently serve as a stepping stone from youth incarceration to community release. Importantly, the state has already renovated one residential community home to be more secure — the Southern Residential Community Home — And Newark's RCH, the Northern Region Independence and Re-entry Success Center, is centrally located in the community and under capacity.

In the case that an RCH cannot be renovated/repurposed or is far away from a community disproportionately impacted by youth incarceration, the state should follow a two-pronged approach.

First, in partnership with the community, the state should identify community-based locations that can be renovated/repurposed (such as schools, churches, etc.) to serve as small, youth-focused secure placements for the small number of youth who must be out-of-home for a limited time for public safety reasons. Among other things, these publicly run placements must be treatment-focused, child-centered, rehabilitative, incorporate family interaction and filled with public workers trained in effective youth rehabilitation practices. Significantly, the proposed placements should be no more than 30 beds, and should be tied to financial incentives to reduce the youth population in the placements on an annual basis. After a date in time, to be set in agreement with the community, the placement should be closed forever as a youth facility and should be transitioned into a community resource center open to all community residents. Notably, rather than using funds to construct new facilities — that will divert needed resources away from communities, expand the mass incarceration footprint (despite the low numbers of incarcerated youth) and are an inefficient use of resources — the state should repurpose or renovate existing structures. The Hogan Street Regional Youth Center in St. Louis, Missouri, a former church school now used as a secure placement, provides a strong example of what is possible in terms of renovated community-based secure placements.

And second, the state should identify all RCHs that are ineffective placements — because they may be too outdated, old, or otherwise inappropriate for rehabilitation — close them and divert the cost savings to the state lockbox fund described below. Importantly any RCH closure savings must be diverted to front-end youth programming and not be used to fill in non-related budget deficits.

Importantly, rather than concentrating on secure placements, the focus of the continuum of care should be on funneling funds into the front end of the youth justice system to prevent deeper entrenchment. Every effort should be made to keep young people in their homes and enrolled in effective treatment and service programs along the continuum. Only in the rare instance where a young person cannot be kept in the community for public safety reasons should an out-of-home placement be considered. And, in that situation, the young person should be housed in a community-based placement within the continuum of care, not in a faraway youth prison.

The state should pilot a program, in partnership with community members, to develop and fund these community-based continuums of care in cities in the north, central and southern parts of the state that are most impacted by youth incarceration. Once the continuum has been established in these cities, the state should announce closure dates for all three of its youth prisons — including JMSF — and develop closure transition plans.

POLICY PROPOSAL 2

New Jersey should create a \$100 million lockbox fund to finance the youth community-based continuum of care.

At a time when the state is proposing cuts to a number of programs that support Black communities, there have been minimal cuts to the state's youth incarceration budget.

To make Black lives really matter in New Jersey, the state must put dollars behind its words. Thus, the state should commit \$100 million dollars to a lockbox Youth Justice Transformation Fund to finance the youth community-based continuum of care — with a focus on the communities most impacted by youth incarceration.

Just as Governor Murphy previously committed \$100 million dollars to combat the opioid epidemic in the Garden State,⁷⁸ through diverting funds from youth incarceration and other funding mechanisms, the state should use this moment in time to commit funding toward keeping Black communities whole.

While the ultimate goal is to amass a \$100 appropriation for the Fund, the state can begin to make a meaningful financial commitment by passing A4663/S2924, which will appropriate \$8.4 million in emergency funds for the creation of a Restorative and Transformative

Justice for Youths and Communities Pilot Program. This pilot program — which will take place in Trenton, Camden, Paterson and Newark — will include the creation of restorative justice hubs and enhanced reentry services to both support the young people being released from youth prisons in response to COVID-19 and to prevent young people from entering the youth justice system in the first place.


POLICY PROPOSAL 3

New Jersey should pass the New Jersey Youth Justice Transformation Act.

To carry out the above two proposals and more, New Jersey should pass the New Jersey Youth Justice Transformation Act (A710/S315).80

The bill contains the following transformative provisions:

 Sets closure deadlines for Jamesburg and Hayes and mandates a JMSF closure plan;



- Requires New Jersey to develop a comprehensive youth prison closure transition plan which includes individualized plans for transitioning youth, a review of youth placement assessment tools, a workers' transition plan and recommendations for repurposing youth prisons as helpful, rather than harmful, resources:
- Requires a comprehensive assessment of New Jersey's eleven residential community homes;
- Outlines, if necessary because a residential community home is not an appropriate placement, the development of community-based youth rehabilitation centers that follow national best practices and are developed with community input;
- Creates a moratorium on new youth prison construction;
- Creates a \$100 million Youth Justice Transformation Fund for community-based youth programs;
- Requires a racial and ethnic disparities study to collect data on disparities at every stage of youth justice system involvement and the development of an implementation plan to reduce these disparities;
- Places youth incarceration as the last adjudication disposition option (rather than the default); and
- Increases county Youth Services Commission transparency.

With the successful passage of the New Jersey Youth Justice Transformation Act, the Garden State can serve as a national model in developing an effective and well-funded youth community-based continuum of care that incorporates both front-end programming and services and effective and rehabilitative community-based out-of-home placements.



Credit: Akintola Hanif

CONCLUSION

In this pandemic moment, millions of people across America have taken to the streets to protest how COVID-19 has exacerbated long-standing structural inequities in our country's Black communities.

New Jersey should harness the power of this time to put money and resources into developing a youth community-based continuum of care for its young people and closing its three youth prisons (including JMSF). In making this investment, the state can show in practice, beyond the hashtag, that here in the Garden State, Black Lives — including Black Youths' Lives — Matter.

Endnotes

- ¹ Race/Ethnicity by State, 2017 (Rate per 100,000 juveniles), Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement 1997-2018, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezac-jrp/asp/State Race.asp?state=59&topic=State Race&year=2017&percent=rate (last visited October 11, 2020).
- ² Joshua Rovner, The Sentencing Project, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests 6 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Racial-Disparities-in-Youth-Commitments-and-Arrests.pdf; see also Nat'l Juvenile Justice Network, Implicit Bias: Why It Matters for Youth Justice 1 (2017), https://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/NJJN%20Implicit%20Bias%20Snapshot%202017.pdf?phpMyAdmin=14730ab3483c-51c94ca868bccffa06ef ("Even though white youth and youth of color engage in illegal behavior at similar rates, substantial over-representation of youth of color in the juvenile justice systems across our country and disparities in treatment remains a serious problem.").
- ³ Rovner, *supra* note 2, at 6-7.
- ⁴ N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n, Secure Care Census as of June 1, 2020 (2020) (unpublished) (on file with author).
- ⁵ *Id*.
- ⁶ N.J. Dep't of the Treasury Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Governor's FY 2021 Detailed Budget D-256 (2020), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/omb/publications/21budget/pdf/FY21GBM.pdf.
- ⁷ N.J. DEP'T OF CORR. ET AL., RELEASE COHORT OUTCOME REPORT: A THREE-YEAR FOLLOW UP 3 (2015), https://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/offender statistics/2015 Release Recidivism Report.pdf.
- ⁸ See 150 Years is Enough, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, https://www.njisj.org/150_years_is_enough (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
- ⁹ See Press Release, Insider NJ, Governor Christie Announces Unprecedented Investment in Juvenile Justice System (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/governor-christie-announces-unprecedented-investment-juvenile-justice-system/; Press Release, N.J. Inst. for Soc. Justice, Institute Statement on Governor Christie's Plan to Close New Jersey Youth Prisons (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.njisj.org/institute_statement_on_governor_christie_s_plan_to_close_two new jersey youth prisons.
- ¹⁰ See N.J. Leg., Law & Public Safety Dep't Response to OLS Questions on FY 2019-2020 Budget 53-54, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/budget_2020/LPS_response_2020.pdf ("The JJC intends to replace the New Jersey Training School and Hayes with three (3) smaller (48 bed), state-of-the art regional facilities. . . . At present, JJC projects completion of the Southern and Central Region Facilities in October 2024 while the Northern Facility will likely be completed approximately one year later.").
- ¹¹ See N.J. Econ. Dev. Auth.: \$375,680,000 State Lease Revenue Bonds 16 (2018), https://emma.msrb.org/ES1089696-ES848953-ES1250133.pdf (listing Series C Bonds for State Lease Revenue Bonds (State Government Buildings Juvenile Justice Commission Facilities Project) at \$160,325,000 in Principal and \$151,013,011 in Interest for a total cost of \$311,338,011).
- ¹² N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n, Youth Admitted to JMSF, 2018 2 (2019) (unpublished) (on file with author).
- ¹³ See, e,g., Antoinette Davis et al., Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency, Close to Home: Strategies to Place Young People in Their Communities (2014) http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/close-to-home. pdf (describing the importance of a local continuum of placement options within the community for system-involved youth); Vincent Schiraldi, The Square One Project, Executive Session on the Future of Justice Policy: Can We Eliminate the Youth Prison? (And What Should We Replace it With?) (2020), https://backend.nokidsinprison.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CJLJ8234-Square-One-Youth-Prisons-Paper-200616-WEB.pdf (recognizing trend of closing youth prisons and shifting toward community programs and close to home facilities when needed).

- ¹⁴ See, e.g., Liz Ryan, Youth Prisons are Old, Outdated, and Obsolete, MEDIUM (July 14, 2016), https://medium.com/@ LizRyanYJ/youth-prisons-are-old-outdated-and-obsolete-eb1305f94eae (describing how youth prisons were developed out of the desire to segregate children from adults but transitioned into penal, harmful institutions).
- ¹⁵ Andrea McChristian, N.J. Inst. for Soc. Justice, Bring Our Children Home: Ain't I A Child? 5-6 (2016), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/njisj/pages/465/attachments/original/1482183464/Ain't_I_A_Child_Final_.pdf?1482183464.
- ¹⁶ See Press Release, Insider NJ, supra note 9.
- ¹⁷ See, e.g., Shelley Zavlek, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Planning Community-Based Facilities for Violent Juvenile Offenders as Part of a System of Graduated Sanctions (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/209326.pdf (proffering research that highlights the primacy of community-based secure placements for those youth who have committed serious offenses). Of note, while in this piece Zavlek supports the construction of new secure facilities located within communities, for the reasons outlined in this report, the Institute advocates for the renovation/repurposing of existing community-based structures for the small number of young people who need to be out of home, not new construction.
- ¹⁸ Laura Cohen & James Moeser, *Reforming the Juvenile Justice System*, 296 N.J. Law. 42, 42 (Oct. 2015) ("Although the primary purpose of juvenile court intervention is rehabilitative, NJTS and the JJC's two additional secure facilities look and function much like prisons.").
- ¹⁹ See, e.g., Eli Hager, There are Still 80 'Youth Prisons' in the U.S. Here are Five Things to Know About Them, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/03/there-are-still-80-youth-prisons-in-the-u-s-here-are-five-things-to-know-about-them (stating that youth prisons are typically characterized by over 100 beds, locked doors, remote locations and an overemphasis on security).
- ²⁰ Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Audit Report for the Juvenile Medium Security Facility 2-3 (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nj.gov/oag/jjc/pdf/2017-PREA-Auditor-Summary JMSF.pdf.
- ²¹ See JJC Secure Care Facilities: Johnstone Campus, N.J. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM'N, https://www.nj.gov/oag/jjc/secure_johnstone.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) ("The Johnstone Campus has the capacity to serve 262 male offenders."). Please note, however, that the JMSF PREA Audit states that JMSF has a maximum capacity of 163 youth. See PREA Audit Report for JMSF, supra note 20, at 1.
- ²² See Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 42.
- ²³ See id.
- ²⁴ See Justice Policy Inst., Healing Invisible Wounds: Why Investing in Trauma-Informed Care for Children Makes Sense 1 (2010), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_REP_HealingInvisibleWounds_JJ-PS.pdf ("Research shows that while up to 34 percent of children in the United States have experienced at least one traumatic event, between 75 and 93 percent of youth entering the juvenile justice system annually in this country are estimated to have experienced some degree of trauma.").
- ²⁵ See Race/Ethnicity by State, supra note 1.
- ²⁶ See Youth Admitted to JMSF, supra note 12.
- ²⁷ See Secure Care Census, supra note 4.
- ²⁸ See ROVNER, supra note 2, at 6-7.
- ²⁹ See Race/Ethnicity by State, supra note 1.
- ³⁰ See Governor's FY 2021 Detailed Budget, supra note 6.
- ³¹ *Id*.
- ³² *Id*.

- ³³ See Katherine Landergan, Murphy Signs \$32.7 Budget that 'Will be There for the People of New Jersey,' Politico (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/30/phil-murphy-budget-new-jersey-424274.
- ³⁴ N.J. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GOVERNOR'S FY 2021 REVISED BUDGET PROPOSAL 30 (2020), https://www.nj.gov/treasury/omb/publications/21budget/pdf/ReportontheRevisedFY21Budget.pdf. Of note, the Governor's Office and the Department of the Treasury asked each department to propose 15 percent spending reductions. *Id.* at 8.
- ³⁵ See L. 2020, c. 97, § 66, 131: 28 (N.J. 2020), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2020/Bills/AL20/97_.pdf (appropriating \$6,352,000 for the 9-month state/community partnership grant program expenditure); GOVERNOR'S FY 2021 REVISED BUDGET PROPOSAL, *supra* note 34, at 42 (showing an \$8,470,000 FY 2020 appropriation compared to the \$8,258,000 FY 2021 appropriation).
- ³⁶ Andrea McChristian, N.J. Inst. for Soc. Justice, Bring our Children Home: Building up Kids Through New Jersey's Youth Services Commissions (2019), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/njisj/pages/1345/attachments/original/1565122296/Bring Our Children Home LowRes.pdf?1565122296.
- ³⁷ *Id.* at 5.
- ³⁸ Nat'l Conference of State Legislators, Mental Health Needs of Juvenile Offenders 2 https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-mental.pdf.
- ³⁹ Youth Admitted to JMSF, *supra* note 12.
- ⁴⁰ N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n, Committed Youth in NJTS, JMSF, JFSCIF and DOVES on June 1, 2017 (2017) (unpublished) (on file with author).
- ⁴¹ See Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, *Mental Illness and Juvenile Offenders*, Int'l J. Environ. Res. Pub. Health 7 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4772248/pdf/ijerph-13-00228.pdf.
- ⁴² *Id.* at 8.
- ⁴³ See Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Intersection Between Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System 4-5 (2017), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Intersection-Mental-Health-Juvenile-Justice.pdf.
- ⁴⁴ Underwood et al., *supra* note 41, at 8.
- ⁴⁵ Carly Sitrin, Proposed Cuts to New Jersey School-Based Mental Health Services 'Unconscionable,' Educators Say, Politico (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2020/09/01/proposed-cuts-to-school-based-mental-health-services-unconscionable-educators-say-1314114.
- ⁴⁶ Erik Ortiz, 'Dangerous' Cut to Mental Health Services at N.J. Schools is Restored, NBC News (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dangerous-cut-mental-health-services-n-j-schools-restored-n1241093.
- ⁴⁷ The Institute recognizes that while "special needs" is a popular term to describe youth with disabilities, it has also been viewed by some as a problematic euphemism. To that end, the Institute uses the phrases "youth with disabilities" or "disabled youth."
- ⁴⁸ Jackie Mader & Sarah Butrymowicz, *Pipeline to Prison: Special education too often leads to jail for thousands of American children*, Hechinger Report (Oct. 26, 2014), https://hechingerreport.org/pipeline-prison-special-education-often-leads-jail-thousands-american-children/.
- ⁴⁹ See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Beyond Suspensions: Examining School Discipline Policies and Connections to the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Students of Color with Disabilities (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/07-23-Beyond-Suspensions.pdf; Leah Aileen Hill, *Disrupting the Trajectory: Representing Disabled African American Boys in a System Designed to Send Them to Prison*, 45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 201 (2017), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2722&context=ulj.

- ⁵⁰ Supporting Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections, U.S. Dep't of Educ.: Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Servs. Blog (May 23, 2017), https://sites.ed.gov/osers/2017/05/supporting-youth-with-disabilities-in-juvenile-corrections/.
- ⁵¹ See Youth Admitted to JMSF, supra note 12.
- ⁵² See, e.g., Denise C. Herz & Carly B. Dierkhising, *Our New Data on Dual System Youth Show Deep Collaboration, More Info is Crucial*, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://jjie.org/2019/03/11/our-new-data-on-dual-system-youth-show-deep-collaboration-more-info-is-crucial/.
- ⁵³ See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy Nat'l Res. Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, From Conversation to Collaboration: How Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Agencies Can Work Together to Improve Outcomes for Dual Status Youth 5 (2014), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/539; Savannah Felix, *Improving Multisystem Collaboration for Crossover Youth*, U. Chi. Sch. Soc. Serv. Admin.: Advocates' F. 17 (2016), https://ssa.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/AdvocatesForum 2016 Final.pdf.
- ⁵⁴ See Robert F. Kennedy Nat'l Res. Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, supra note 53, at 3.
- ⁵⁵ NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, WHEN SYSTEMS COLLABORATE: HOW THREE JURISDICTIONS IMPROVED THEIR HANDLING OF DUAL-STATUS CASES 3 (2015), http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/Juvenile%20Justice%20Geography,%20Policy,%20Practice%20and%20Statistics%202015/WhenSystemsCollaborateJJGPSCaseStudyFinal042015.pdf.
- ⁵⁶ See Youth Admitted to JMSF, supra note 12.
- ⁵⁷ See Robert F. Kennedy Nat'l Res. Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, *supra* note 53, at 3.
- ⁵⁸ See ZAVLEK, supra note 17, at 6.
- ⁵⁹ See N.J. DEP'T OF CORR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
- ⁶⁰ See, e.g., ZAVLEK, supra note 17, at 6 ("Clearly, just locking up these youth is not enough. It is critically important to provide effective treatment programs designed to enhance their chances for success when they return to the community.")
- ⁶¹ See Justice Policy Institute, Smart, Safe, and Fair: Strategies to Prevent Youth Violence, Heal Victims of Crime, and Reduce Racial Inequality 21-22 (2018), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/Smart Safe and Fair 9 5 18.pdf.
- ⁶² See ZAVLEK, supra note 17, at 5-6.
- ⁶³ See Justice Policy Institute, supra note 61, at 37.
- ⁶⁴ See id. at 27-28.
- ⁶⁵ See, e.g., Karen U. Lindell & Katrina L. Goodjoint, Juv. L. Ctr., Rethinking Justice for Emerging Adults: Spotlight on the Great Lakes Region 10 (2020), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2020-09/JLC-Emerging-Adults-9-2.pdf.
- ⁶⁶ See Youth Admitted to JMSF, supra note 12.
- ⁶⁷ *Id*.
- ⁶⁸ See Zavlek, supra note 17, at 6.
- ⁶⁹ RETHA ONITIRI, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUSTICE ET AL., YOUTH JUSTICE TOOLKIT: A COMMUNITY-LED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2020), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/njisj/pages/1427/attachments/original/1595600849/Youth_Justice Toolkit Final.pdf?1595600849.
- ⁷⁰ *Id*.

- ⁷⁵ See Residential Community Homes List, supra note 73; Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Audit Report for the Northern Region Independence & Re-entry Success Center 3 (May 17, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/oag/jjc/pd-f/2019-PREA-Audit-Report Northern-Region-Independence-and-ReEntry-Success-Center.pdf.
- ⁷⁶ See, e.g., Youth First Initiative, Opposing New Construction of Youth Correctional Facilities (2020), https://backend.nokidsinprison.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/NKIP-No-New-Construction-Report-Pages.pdf.
- ⁷⁷ See id.; Hogan Street Regional Youth Center, MO Off. Admin., https://archive.oa.mo.gov/fmdc/Institutional_Information/pdf/Hogan Street Regional Youth Center.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
- ⁷⁸ Press Release, Office of the Governor, *Governor Murphy Announces New Initiatives to Combat the Opioid Epidemic* (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562019/approved/20190123b.shtml.
- ⁷⁹ A. 4663/S. 294, 219th Leg. (N.J. 2020), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2020/Bills/A5000/4663 I1.PDF.
- ⁸⁰ New Jersey Youth Justice Transformation Act, A. 710/S. 315, 219th Leg. (N.J. 2020), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2020/Bills/A1000/710 I1.PDF.

⁷¹ The Institute and partners successfully advocated for the introduction of S2519/A4235, legislation that will provide for the early release of young people with less than a year on their sentence in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The bill was signed into law on October 19, 2020.

⁷² See, e.g, ZAVLEK, *supra* note 17.

⁷³ See Residential Community Homes List, Office of the Attorney Gen.: N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n, https://www.nj.gov/oag/jjc/residential community list.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).

⁷⁴ E-mail from Jennifer LeBaron, Acting Exec. Dir., N.J. Juvenile Justice Comm'n, to author (Sept. 22, 08:24 EST) (on file with author).



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